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The Effect of a Financial Crisis on Household Finances:
A Case Study of Iceland’s Financial Crisis*
Axel Hall,† Andri S. Scheving,‡ and Gylfi Zoega§
Abstract
Iceland experienced a financial crisis in 2008–2009 when its banking system collapsed,
the currency lost half its value, most businesses became technically insolvent, house
prices fell, and household debt increased due to indexation to foreign currencies or the
price level. This paper tells the story of the crisis and maps the losses to households using
a dataset from tax returns that includes all taxpayers in the country and contains the
value of housing, mortgage debt, disposable income, and net worth. For relative losses in
net worth, the results show that families with children, especially those with parents aged
between 24 and 45 years, suffered the largest proportional losses in net worth. The losses
were also greater in urban areas. The fall in net worth, measured in local currency,
correlated with income and education level as well as the number of children and the
urban area. Real disposable income fell by one third or more for a large fraction of the
population, causing a further increase in the burden of debt, which increased most for the
high-income groups before falling due to rising income and mortgage relief. Urban areas,
where banks are located, experienced a boom-bust cycle, while the rural areas
experienced this cycle to a much lesser extent. We find that net worth took many years to
recover but that by 2019, net worth had recovered for all age groups.
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1. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 had a severe impact on households in Iceland. This
paper endeavors to determine which groups were hit hardest and how different groups
recovered during the postcrisis period. We use a database containing the income tax
returns of all taxpayers in the country from 2003 to 2019, both to provide a graphical
illustration of the effect on different household types and to conduct econometric analysis
to explore further the losses experienced by different groups during the crisis.
We are not the first to explore the effect of Iceland’s financial crisis on household
finances.1 However, our data go further back, they include all households in the country,
and they include data up to 2019. This enables us to map changes in wealth, debt, net
worth, and debt burden (defined as the ratio of debt to disposable income) during the
run-up to the 2008 collapse, its immediate aftermath, and the years that followed.
The paper begins with a discussion of how the financial crisis started, followed by a
section describing the many forms of mortgage relief introduced by the government.
Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 conducts graphical analysis for different
groups. Panel data analysis is then used in Section 6 to determine the effects the crisis
had on different types of households. Section 7 summarizes the results and provides
conclusions.

2. The rise and fall of the bubble economy
The prelude to the crisis started with the privatization of Iceland’s banking system in
2003 in an era of low interest rates and low risk premia in international capital markets.
This allowed the new owners of the banks to borrow from foreign banks, both to finance
foreign investments (their own or those of related parties) and to expand credit
domestically.
What set Iceland apart from some of the other crisis countries in 2008 was the expansion
of the banks’ balance sheets. By the time of the collapse, Iceland’s banking sector was
larger, in terms of income, than the fishing and agricultural sectors combined. From 2004
to 2008, average annual asset growth for the country’s three largest banks—Glitnir,
Kaupthing, and Landsbanki—ranged between 50% and 61%. The banking system’s assetto-GDP ratio quintupled in less than five years, rising from 1.74 to 8.64 between year-end
2003 and August 2008. Real house prices doubled between 2003 and 2008, and share
prices increased by a factor of 10 due to the rapid expansion of credit.

Olafsson and Vignisdottir (2012) find that most of the households that had negative net worth after the
crisis were already in trouble before the crisis. They find that indebted families with children and foreigndenominated debt (FX borrowers) were more likely to experience financial distress than childless families
with debt denominated in domestic currency. Young individuals and couples with children who had bought
their first property in 2007 and early 2008 were especially vulnerable. At the end of 2010, approximately
half of households in financial distress were from age groups within the 30–49 range.
1
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Early in 2006, Icelandic banks’ access to the European securities market grew tighter
because of credit rating downgrades, pushing funding costs higher. In 2007, Edge and
Icesave, foreign retail deposit accounts offered by Kaupthing and Landsbanki,
respectively, were critical sources of funding when borrowing from foreign banks
became more difficult (Benediktsdottir, Danielsson, and Zoega 2011). But in 2008, access
to foreign capital dried up completely and the banking system was, to put it mildly, in
trouble. In 2008, shortly before the fall of the banks, net national foreign debt totaled
356% of GDP, up from 62.6% of GDP in 2003, and the banks were unable to roll over their
debt. This triggered a sudden stop of capital inflows, the fatal blow coming with the fall
of Lehman Brothers on September 15. Between Monday, October 6, and Wednesday,
October 8, 2008, the Icelandic banks collapsed, followed by a 75% decline in the lead
stock market index. House prices declined, the currency lost half its value, output started
to contract, and unemployment rose rapidly in the months thereafter (Halldorsson and
Zoega 2010).
At the end of 2007, households were heavily leveraged, with debt averaging 225% of their
disposable income and 100% of GDP, according to the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI).
Approximately 80% of household debt was indexed to the consumer price index (CPI).
This debt soared during the crisis due to the surging price level, leaving these households
more indebted than before. Inflation measured 5.9% at the end of 2007 but had risen to
18.1% by the end of 2008—its highest rate since 1989, when it measured 25.2%. In 2009,
inflation was 7.5% (Statistics Iceland n.d.1). Even more vulnerable were the 13% of
households that had foreign-denominated debt (FX borrowers). The Icelandic krona
depreciated by 48% from 2007 to 2009, severely affecting these FX borrowers by
increasing their outstanding mortgage balances in local currency terms.
The CBI was unable to act as a lender of last resort for the Icelandic banks in 2008 because
the banking sector was operating mostly in foreign currencies. Earlier, it had attracted
capital inflows in the form of carry trade through high policy rates, which also created an
incentive for domestic firms and households to borrow in foreign currencies. The
combination of these dynamics created financial fragilities when the carry trade
unwound in 2008, making the currency depreciate (Benediktsdottir, Danielsson, and
Zoega 2011). When push came to shove, the CBI tried to help the domestic banks with
domestic currency liquidity by accepting collateral that later proved worthless—bonds
issued by other banks—and depleting its foreign reserves in the attempt to rescue them
(Benediktsdottir, Danielsson, and Zoega 2011). These efforts were in vain. When it came
to the solvency of the banks, any government assurances given to the banking sector
would have been meaningless because the government was not financially strong enough
to back up the oversized banking system. The banking sector had simply grown too fast,
mushrooming from a medium-sized system in 2003 to one proportionally larger than
Switzerland’s by 2007 (Benediktsdottir, Eggertsson, and Þorarinsson 2019; Thomsen
2018).
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) find that growth during the crisis was lower in countries
with higher income per capita, high precrisis credit growth, and current account deficits,
all characteristics of Iceland’s precrisis economy. They made a list of countries with the
five worst performances in six categories during the financial crisis from 2008–2009—
GDP growth, total demand growth, private consumption growth, investment growth,
export growth, and import growth. Iceland was one of the few developed countries to
appear on this list, and it did so for multiple reasons: total aggregate demand fell by
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14.6% private consumption decreased by 11.3%; investment declined by 37.1%; and
because the krona depreciated significantly in this period, it comes as no surprise that
imports fell by 21.2%—a direct consequence of the collapse of the banking sector. The
only other countries to share as many reasons for being on the list were Estonia and
Latvia. Other developed countries found on the list were Lithuania, Malta, Italy, and Japan,
the latter two because of a fall in export growth and not due to domestic reasons.
The government received assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
2008. In order to prevent large changes in the currency exchange rate, the IMF program
involved high interest rates, capital controls, and the use of foreign reserves (Halldorsson
and Zoega 2010). The program featured contractionary monetary policy and the
imposition of capital controls to stabilize the exchange rate, allowing the automatic
stabilizers of fiscal policy to increase domestic demand and setting out a plan for debt
restructuring and the reorganization of the banking system. An important objective of the
restructuring was to shield the public sector from taking on the banks’ losses, making the
intervention a bail-in instead of bailout. The government took ownership of the program
and opted for a combination of changes in taxes and expenditures that protected the most
vulnerable households (Ólafsson et al. 2019). The program was a resounding success,
underpinning the recovery that started in the summer of 2010 (Thomsen 2018).

3. Mortgage relief
After the banking sector collapsed in October 2008, many households faced severe
financial difficulties. The economic plan aimed to redistribute income across income
groups so that lower-earning households would be protected, and the government
created numerous schemes for this purpose. These included increased mortgage interest
subsidies, increased child support tax relief, and temporary suspension of the CPI
indexation of mortgage loans. The rescheduling of mortgage repayments was made
possible, and households could apply for a temporary freeze on repayments. More direct
measures that were introduced thereafter reduced outstanding mortgage balances for
those facing the greatest difficulties. One measure cut the value of mortgages to 110% of
the value of the underlying property, a ratio that was lowered to 70% for the lowestearning households. In 2014, the government took action to correct for the effect of
inflation on outstanding local currency balances of CPI-indexed mortgages. This
inflationary effect was measured as the deviation of inflation from the target in 2008 and
2009. The government’s policy action took two forms. The first was a direct mortgage
relief option that reduced the borrower’s outstanding mortgage. If the mortgage was no
longer outstanding, the taxpayer was instead provided a tax credit toward future tax
payments. The mortgage relief applied only to borrowers who had an indexed mortgage
on an owner-occupied residential property during 2008 to 2009. This measure benefited
approximately 90,000 households, far more than any other form of mortgage relief
provided during the crisis.2 The direct relief was capped at approximately $300,000 per
household. The reduction in outstanding mortgage loan balances was made in three parts
between 2014 and 2016 and financed by levying a special tax on the banks’ new owners,
particularly to include foreign “vulture” funds.

If a household had received assistance from the government through other programs, this assistance
was deducted from the total sum the household was eligible to receive.
2
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The second policy action was an authorization to apply (tax-free) private pension savings
(third-pillar pension savings) to reduce an outstanding mortgage balance on any
mortgage held during the crisis period, 2008–2009. This authorization did not require a
specific type of mortgage and was available to all borrowers with private pension
accounts. Homeowners who held non-indexed loans, and thus did not receive the direct
government write-down of their mortgages, could use tax-free pension funds to reduce
their outstanding principal. Also, first-time homebuyers and nonowners could use taxfree pension funds for current or future home purchases. This government scheme was
originally expected to remain in effect from July 1, 2014, through June 30, 2017, but it
was subsequently extended through June 30, 2021, and was then extended further.
The government’s mortgage relief of 2014 was triggered by an earlier decision by the
courts. In 2010, the Supreme Court of Iceland3 ruled retroactively that loans denominated
in the domestic currency but indexed to the exchange rate were illegal. The confusion was
caused by unclear legislation passed in 2001 with the intention of aligning Icelandic law
with European Union legislation. In effect, under the laws passed in 2001, it became legal
to borrow in foreign currencies but not to take local currency loans indexed to the
exchange rate. In the years that followed, until the crash in 2008, however, most
household loans were of the latter type. When, in 2010, these loans were adjudged illegal,
the decision provided a windfall for households that had taken on debt indexed to the
exchange rate. In effect, this rewarded risk taking and called for a similar adjustment of
CPI-indexed loans that were less risky.

4. Description of the data
The dataset is from Statistics Iceland and includes income tax returns dating back to tax
year 1981. The most recent tax return data are from tax year 2019. This dataset was
originally collected by Iceland Revenue and Customs and then submitted to Statistics
Iceland.4 We also have information on taxpayers’ education. In addition to data on
income,5 wealth, and debt, the tax returns contain information on taxpayers’ gender, age,
domicile, and number of children. From 1996 to 2019, we also have information on the
sector in which taxpayers were employed. It is possible to determine when individuals
bought their first home.6 Throughout this paper, all figures are expressed in the average
price level of 2019 when relevant.
The dataset contains information on taxpayers’ debt, assets, and disposable income,
making it possible to calculate net worth. It also itemizes debt and assets, making it
possible to see how much individuals owned (real estate, stocks, savings accounts, etc.)
and how much they owed (e.g., mortgages and student loans). Because stocks and bonds
are expressed in nominal value rather than market value, this complicates the
interpretation of losses with these variables. The problem applies primarily to the
interpretation of changes in net worth for wealthier segments of the population, which
owned most of the financial assets. Real estate values are taken from Registers Iceland’s

Supreme Court of Iceland ruling No. 471/2010.
The data are encrypted to ensure anonymity.
5 Throughout this paper, disposable income includes capital income unless stated otherwise.
6 If a taxpayer did not report real estate in their tax return the year before but did so in the present year,
then it is assumed that the first property was bought in the present year.
3
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real estate valuation, which follows market prices.7 All calculations involving debt and
jointly taxed individuals are expressed as the average debt for each couple.

5. Evolution of net worth and the burden of debt for different
subgroups
Figure 1 shows household debt relative to GDP from 2000 to 2019, which shows the
extent of domestic credit expansion before the crisis struck in 2008. The red horizontal
line shows the threshold found by Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011) to have an
adverse effect on growth. From 2005 to 2014, the ratio exceeded the 85% threshold.
From 2007 to 2013, it was over 100%. In recent years, this ratio has been much lower,
and below the threshold, due to mortgage relief and increased household saving.
Figure 1: Households’ Debt-to-GDP Ratio
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Sources: Statistics Iceland n.d.1; Statistics Iceland n.d.2.

In 2002, debt equaled 70% of Iceland’s annual GDP. It rose above 85% by 2005 and
continued to increase, peaking at more than 120% of GDP in 2009. Due to a combination
of mortgage relief and increased saving, and helped by the economic recovery, the ratio
then declined in the years following the crisis, reaching 75% of GDP by 2016.
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of house prices (in local currency) from the time the banks
were privatized in 2003 until 2019. Prices rose until 2007 and then fell abruptly with the
collapse of the banks, bottoming out in 2010. There followed a gradual recovery until
2016, when a rapid increase in the number of tourists pushed real house prices above
their 2007 peak. This was caused by the sudden increase in the supply of Airbnb housing,
which reduced the supply of apartments in the local rental market.

7

Registers Iceland’s real estate valuation is measured in February of the prior year.
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Figure 2: Average Real Estate Prices, in Local Currency, Constant 2019 prices

Source: Registers Iceland n.d.

We turn now to how the losses that occurred in the financial crisis affected households.
The losses stemmed from several causes: house prices fell, equity securities became
worthless, and outstanding mortgage balances soared in local currency terms because of
indexation or foreign currency denomination. Although the market value of shares is not
reported in the tax data for a given year, we can discern when shares became worthless
because they then disappeared from the tax returns. Most households also suffered a
reduction in disposable income.
Figure 3 shows how different groups’ ratios of net worth to the mean for the country
(measured as average net worth for all taxpayers aged 20–70 who had positive wage
income) evolved between 2003 and 2019. The groups are defined by age and marital
status. The jointly taxed include married couples and couples who have a child or children
together.8 For jointly taxed individuals, net worth is divided by two and is therefore
comparable to that for single individuals. It is quite clear that for all age groups, the jointly
taxed have much higher net worth than single people do, and the gap between the two
groups widens with age.

Couples who share a permanent address can apply to be registered as cohabitating and thus become
jointly taxed. Some individuals who are married or in a civil partnership choose not to be jointly taxed with
their partners, but this is rare.
8

7

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 4

Figure 3: Average Net Worth, by Marital Status, Relative to the Average Net Worth
of All Taxpayers

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

Among jointly taxed individuals aged 24–55, relative net worth (i.e., relative to the
average for all taxpayers) plummeted when the banking crisis hit the economy. Of these,
individuals in the 36–45 age group suffered the severest blow to their net worth ratio
during the crisis. The oldest group had the relatively best performance, as the ratio of
their net worth to average net worth increased significantly during the crisis years,
whereas most others experienced a decrease.
To determine the causes of developments in each age group’s net worth, it is useful to
show changes in debt and assets over the period. The assets include the market value of
housing and land; the purchase price of cars less depreciation; and the nominal value of
stocks, bonds, and bank deposits. The debt includes mortgage debt, car loans, overdraft,
consumer loans, and student loans. Figure 4 illustrates how the average debt, assets, and
net worth of jointly taxed individuals belonging to different age groups evolved from
2003 to 2019 (in domestic currency and at constant 2019 prices). Note that in Figures 3
and 4, individuals move between age groups as they grow older.
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Figure 4: Average Net Worth, Debt, and Assets of Jointly Taxed Individuals, in Local
Currency

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

In the tax returns, housing is valued at market prices. It follows that changes in house
prices are the main cause of changes in the value of assets and in net worth. The increase
in debt caused by indexation is not visible in 2008 in Figure 4 because the figures are
expressed in constant prices, so that a rise due to indexation to the CPI does not show. At
constant prices, debt increased before the crisis and then fell during the recovery. The
increase was most pronounced for the 36–45 age group. In 2010, the Supreme Court
ruled retroactively that loans indexed to the exchange rate were illegal. The implications
of this decision became clear in 2011 when the affected loans were adjusted, and debt
declined markedly for both single and jointly taxed individuals aged 24–65. Then, in
2014, CPI-indexed debt was reduced by the government, as described above. However,
the effect of this program is not visible in the figure.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of disposable income by marital status and age. Income is
higher for the jointly taxed than for single people, and somewhat higher for single men
than for single women. Disposable income rose during the years before the 2008 crash
but then fell drastically, to a level not seen since 2003. The plunge in disposable income
increased the debt burden, compounding the effect of the indexation-induced jump in
outstanding mortgage balances measured in local currency.
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Figure 5: Average Annual Disposable Income, by Marital Status and Age, in Local
Currency

Note: The sample comprises individuals with non-zero disposable income.
Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

The decline in disposable income was caused not mainly by a drop in wages but by
inflation (itself a result of the depreciation of the currency) and reduced capital income.
Note that real disposable income had not recovered its 2007 peak by 2019 for any group
apart from the youngest and oldest age groups of single women, and it took until 2015–
2016 for it to recover its 2003 level for most of the groups. The fall in 2007–2010 was
large, as can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1: Percentage Change in Average Annual Disposable Income from 2007 to
2010, by Age Group

Jointly taxed
Single men
Single women

16 to 23
–22%
–28%
–18%

24 to 35
–29%
–21%
–19%

Age in Years
36 to 45
46 to 55
–37%
–39%
–27%
–29%
–22%
–24%

56 to 65
–47%
–40%
–29%

66 plus
–44%
–39%
–23%

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

The fall in real disposable income exceeded one-third for many groups and approached
one-half for the jointly taxed aged 56–65. The effect was to increase the burden of debt
because debt was indexed either to the price level or to foreign currencies, while wages
were not indexed to the price level.
Figure 6 shows the ratio of value of assets, debt, and net worth to disposable income
(median value).

10

The Effect of a Financial Crisis on Household Finances

Hall et al.

Figure 6: Ratio of Debt, Net Worth, and the Value of Assets to Disposable Income for
the Jointly Taxed (Average Ratio for Each Age Group)

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

The debt burden jumped in 2008, compounding the effect of the fall in asset prices on the
ratio of net worth to disposable income. Net worth took until 2016 to regain its 2003 level
for the 45 years and younger groups, but the losses for the over 45 were smaller because
their level of debt was lower. The jump in debt was greatest for the 24–55 age groups.9
The increase in the debt burden for those over age 36 was very large, especially for the
jointly taxed and single men. The ratio of debt to disposable income increased by more
than 100% for the jointly taxed over the age of 55 and single men over the age of 35. Note
that the debt burden appears to have fallen for the youngest group, aged 16–23, but this
is explained by the entry of new cohorts who had limited access to credit because of the
financial crisis. The relative change in the debt-to-income ratio—that is, the change in the
ratio relative to its initial value—during the financial crisis is shown in Table 2.

The same graphs for single men and women can be found in the Appendix. As was the case for the jointly
taxed, the decline in asset values affected single taxpayers’ net worth: single men aged 24–35 found
themselves with negative net worth in 2008–2012, as did single men aged 36–45 in 2010. Single women
aged 24–35 had negative net worth from 2008–2014, or two years longer than single men in the same age
group. In 2010, the net worth of single women aged 36–45 was close to zero.
9
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Table 2: Percentage Change in the Ratio of Average Debt to Average Disposable
Income from 2007 to 2010, by Age Group

Jointly taxed
Single men
Single women

16 to 23
–34%
–33%
–37%

24 to 35
14%
20%
3.6%

Age in Years
36 to 45 46 to 55
68%
85%
110%
110%
31%
35%

56 to 65
110%
110%
65%

66 plus
120%
150%
62%

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

Figure 7 shows the median debt burden, defined as the ratio of debt to disposable income,
by income quantile.10 The increase was greatest for the top two quantiles (40%) of the
income distribution, but the recovery was swift due to the rapid increase in disposable
income.
Figure 7: Jointly Taxed—Median Ratio of Debt to Disposable Income, by Disposable
Income Quantile

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

We use the median value of the ratio because the prevalence of low or zero income in the lowest-income
quantile makes the average debt burden not representative for that quantile.
10
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Table 3 shows the relative change in the ratio between 2007 and 2010.
Table 3: Percentage Change in the Ratio of Debt to Disposable Income (Median
Value of the Ratio for Each Income Group), from 2007 to 2010

Change (%)

Quantile 1

Quantile 2

Quantile 3

Quantile 4

Quantile 5

NA11

87%

3.1%

18%

42%

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

The increase in the debt burden—measured as the absolute increase in the ratio of debt
to disposable income—was greatest for the top income group, but the largest relative
change—the proportional change in the debt to income ratio—was largest for the second
income group. Moreover, in subsequent years, the ratio fell below its initial level for the
third and the fourth income groups but not for the lowest and highest groups. The steep
rise in the top groups is explained by the fact that real disposable income fell more in
these groups than in the lower-income groups. This stemmed from two factors: on the
one hand, the importance of capital income for these groups, and on the other hand, the
government’s redistribution policies, which aimed (successfully) at protecting the
disposable income of the lower-income groups.
Nevertheless, there was a significant increase in financial hardship because the lowincome groups found it more difficult to make ends meet. This effect peaked in 2010. The
proportion of people in the lowest-income quantile facing financial hardship rose from
25% in 2007–2009 to 36% in 2010–2012.12 See Ólafsson et al. (2019).
Table 4 shows the percentage movement from one net-worth decile to another between
2007 and 2010. The green diagonal in the table shows the proportion of individuals
remaining in the same group during the period. For example, individuals in decile 5 in
2007 had a 16% chance of ending up in decile 1 in 2010. Only 39% of the individuals who
were in the poorest group in 2007 were still in that group three years later. Among the
wealthiest 50%, movement up or down by more than a decile was uncommon, whereas
the 50% who were poorer in 2007 were more likely to experience larger movements than
the wealthier 50%. The richest 10% were most likely to retain their position, while
deciles 2 through 5 were more likely to move to another group. Large movements
between groups were uncommon during this period, as the values decrease with greater
distance from the green diagonal.

Median value was equal to zero in 2007, which made the proportional change equal to infinity.
Financial hardship is a composite measure based on income poverty, difficulties in making ends meet,
and material deprivation.
11
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Table 4: Movement between Net Worth Deciles, 2007–2010

Decile 1
Decile 2
Decile 3
Decile 4
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Decile 8
Decile 9
Decile 10

Decile
1
0.39
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.16
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01

Decile
2
0.21
0.19
0.22
0.25
0.13
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01

Decile
3
0.10
0.20
0.23
0.14
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01

Decile
4
0.04
0.16
0.24
0.24
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

Decile
5
0.08
0.12
0.13
0.17
0.27
0.12
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.00

Decile
6
0.07
0.07
0.04
0.06
0.20
0.38
0.19
0.05
0.02
0.01

Decile
7
0.04
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.24
0.40
0.19
0.04
0.01

Decile
8
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.21
0.45
0.19
0.02

Decile
9
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.21
0.54
0.16

Decile
10
0.02
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.16
0.76

Probability
of an
increase
0.61
0.71
0.44
0.25
0.30
0.33
0.28
0.24
0.16
0.00

Probability
of a
decrease
0.00
0.10
0.33
0.51
0.43
0.29
0.32
0.31
0.30
0.24

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

6. Econometric analysis
The purpose of this section is to evaluate which groups suffered the greatest losses from
the crisis, using econometric methods. In the following analysis, losses are measured as
the change in net worth between year-end 2007 and 2010, as well as the rise in the debt
burden. The starting point is 2007, when house prices peaked. Real house prices started
to fall when the crisis struck in 2008 and did not stop falling until 2010. Using this period
reveals the losses and gains that households suffered during the worst parts of the crisis.
This section explores the effect on the level of net worth, as well as the percentage change
in net worth and changes in the debt burden.13
Table 5 below lists the explanatory variables. All variables except 1) and 10) are binary
variables. The 36–45 age group is the reference age group for binary age variables, and
jointly taxed households are the reference group for marital/civil partnership status. The
reference group for the first property purchase is those who bought property before
2000. The area between urban and rural—the suburbs of the capital city Reykjavík—is
the reference group for households’ area of residence, and the reference group for the
education variable is those with less than secondary education.

13 Individuals who were younger than 24 years old in 2007

were excluded from the population because this
age group, on average, had few assets and low debt in the years leading up to the financial crisis.
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Table 5: Explanatory Variables
Family characteristics:

Education:

1) Number of children
2) Single men
3) Single women
4) Jointly taxed

16) University education
17) Secondary education
18) Less than secondary education
Area of residence:

Age group:

19) Living in an urban area
20) Living in a suburban area
21) Living in a rural area

5) Age 24–35
6) Age 36–45
7) Age 46–55
8) Age 56–65
9) Older than 65 or disabled

Sector of employment:
22) Working in the finance or
insurance sector

Income and first property bought:
10) Disposable income
11) First property bought before 2000
12) First property bought between 2000
and 2004
13) First property bought between 2005
and 2007
14) First property bought between 2008
and 2010
15) Did not own property in 2000–2010

Each observation is one household, and in the case of jointly taxed households, each
binary explanatory variable corresponds to the oldest individual in the household. For
jointly taxed couples, average net worth and average disposable income within the
household are used, as this makes it possible to compare jointly taxed to single
individuals.14
We estimate these cross-sectional models with iteratively reweighted least squares
(IRLS), where we use the Huber estimation to put less weight on the outliers.15 All
numbers are expressed in the average price level for 2019.

Here, it is important to use average net worth for jointly taxed couples because debt is listed under the
older individual, whereas assets can be listed under both individuals. Therefore, if the couples are not
matched together in the calculations, the net worth of the younger individual is overestimated if the couple
are debtors.
15 This estimation gives data points with smaller residuals greater weight, and higher residuals are assigned
lower weight (Fox and Weisberg 2012).
14
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The housing market changed significantly between the first and second time periods.16
By the end of 2008, the financial crisis had begun to affect the housing market. Real house
prices started to fall after 2007 and continued falling until 2010, when they hit bottom
and subsequently began to rise (see Figure 2 above). Because of this, the last time period
is from 2010.
We start by using the proportional change in net worth as a dependent variable and
subsequently replace it with the absolute change in net worth. We then use the change in
the ratio of debt to disposable income as a dependent variable in order to focus on the
burden of debt. We think of the changes in these variables as reflecting vulnerability to
the crisis.

6.1 Explaining the proportional change in net worth (model A)
This section reveals results from the IRLS estimation, where the dependent variable is
the proportional change in net worth from 2007–2010. To check for robustness, the
model was first regressed with the age group variables, then the family characteristics
variables were added to the model, and so forth. The results are shown in Table 6.
The group that suffered the biggest relative-net-worth blow from the financial crisis was
parents aged 24–45 with lower educational levels and living in an urban area who bought
their first property between 2000 and 2007. Singles also suffered, especially those with
children.
The relationship between the relative change in net worth and disposable income was
statistically insignificant. The outcome for workers in the financial and insurance sector
is interesting. Those workers suffered less severe losses in net worth relative to their
initial level than others within Iceland did. However, as we will see in Table 7, they
suffered greater absolute losses because they had more assets and debt.17
Interpretation of the same model also reveals groups that performed relatively better
than other groups in 2008–2010. These households had the following characteristics:
they did not have children living with them, bought their first property between 2008
and 2010 (i.e., after the crash), were jointly taxed, were over 65, lived outside an urban
area, and had more than compulsory education.

The choice of time periods when households bought their first property was decided based on economic
conditions in the housing market during different years. In the first period, before 2000, the burden from
monthly mortgage payments was not allowed to be more than 18% of gross income, although it was
possible to give exemptions and increase the limit to 30%. In 1999, this rule was abolished. Thus, the
mortgage market changed significantly between the first and second periods.
17 Because we do not know the market value of shares, this group’s losses may be underestimated.
16
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Table 6: Results from Model A. Independent Variable Is a Proportional Change in Net Worth from 2007–2010. The Model Is
Estimated with IRLS

(Intercept)
24 to 35 years old
46 to 55 years old
56 to 65 years old
66 years old and older + disabled
Number of children
Single man
Single woman
University education
Secondary education
Disposable Income
First real estate 2000-2004
First real estate 2005-2007
First real estate 2008-2010
No real estate
Capital area
Rural area
Financial or insurance sector

Significance codes:

1st Horse Race
Estimate t value
-0.49 -92.32 ***
-0.64 -90.62 ***
0.12 15.77 ***
0.22 26.53 ***
0.24 34.03 ***

0.001 '***'

0.01 '**'

2nd Horse Race
Estimate t value
-0.40 -42.96 ***
-0.27 -30.95 ***
0.09
9.42 ***
0.18 16.44 ***
0.25 26.25 ***
-0.02 -6.62 ***
-0.30 -37.76 ***
-0.12 -17.16 ***

0.05 '*'

3rd Horse Race
Estimate t value
-0.53 -48.49 ***
-0.15 -15.90 ***
0.10
9.62 ***
0.20 17.06 ***
0.31 29.90 ***
-0.03 -8.44 ***
-0.29 -34.99 ***
-0.06 -7.52 ***
0.20 24.95 ***
0.13 19.52 ***

0.1 '.'

4th Horse Race
Estimate t value
-0.51 -44.19 ***
-0.15 -15.00 ***
0.10
9.33 ***
0.20 16.60 ***
0.30 27.88 ***
-0.02 -5.81 ***
-0.30 -33.88 ***
-0.07 -8.21 ***
0.18 21.84 ***
0.12 17.44 ***
0.00 -0.40
-0.09 -10.94 ***
-0.03 -2.51 **
2.89 124.94 ***
0.14 12.86 ***

5th Horse Race
Estimate t value
-0.53 -38.27 ***
-0.14 -14.17 ***
0.09
8.20 ***
0.19 15.45 ***
0.29 26.64 ***
-0.03 -7.54 ***
-0.29 -32.35 ***
-0.04 -5.23 ***
0.24 28.34 ***
0.15 21.29 ***
0.00
0.14
-0.09 -10.72 ***
-0.04 -3.46 ***
2.89 122.85 ***
0.12 10.74 ***
-0.07 -7.91 ***
0.21 20.22 ***

6th Horse Race
Estimate t value
-0.53 -37.35 ***
-0.16 -16.51 ***
0.09
9.25 ***
0.19 15.82 ***
0.28 19.82 ***
-0.03 -7.14 ***
-0.16 -16.68 ***
-0.20 -22.43 ***
0.24 27.75 ***
0.15 19.03 ***
0.00
0.35
-0.09 -10.46 ***
-0.02 -1.48
2.66 116.38 ***
0.21 17.56 ***
-0.05 -5.06 ***
0.17 15.94 ***
0.04
2.92 **

1''

Notes: IRLS=iteratively reweighted least squares. Statistics for 6th Horse Race: P-value of Breusch-Pagan test: 0.4. Since the P-value is greater than 0.05, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the model includes no linear heteroscedasticity. Thus, we infer that there is no heteroscedasticity and the standard errors, and the tvalues, are unbiased.
Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

17

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 4

Table 7: Results from Model B. Independent Variable Is Level Change in Net Worth from 2007–2010. The Model Is Estimated
with IRLS
Estimate
(Intercept)
- 7,919,751
24 to 35 years old
4,490,679
46 to 55 years old
- 1,147,038
56 to 65 years old
- 1,864,630
66 years old and older + disabled 1,319,892
Number of children
Single man
Single woman
University education
Secondary education
Disposable Income
First real estate 2000-2004
First real estate 2005-2007
First real estate 2008-2010
No real estate
Capital area
Rural area
Fnancial or insurance sector
Significance codes:

0 '***'

1
z value
-97.80 ***
47.52 ***
-9.55 ***
-13.30 ***
12.86 ***

Estimate
- 8,001,651
2,450,030
- 1,988,771
- 3,357,824
- 1,144,299
- 1,535,236
5,174,813
3,908,806

2
z value
-77.43 ***
26.84 ***
-17.23 ***
-24.19 ***
-11.11 ***
-33.17 ***
62.78 ***
51.71 ***

-

-

0.001 '**'

0.01 '*'

3
Estimate z value
6,677,089 -59.24 ***
2,458,699 26.97 ***
2,020,056 -17.55 ***
3,547,158 -25.61 ***
1,733,087 -16.41 ***
1,554,011 -33.67 ***
4,942,888 59.79 ***
3,711,405 49.14 ***
2,035,246 -22.70 ***
1,514,698 -21.86 ***

0.05 '.'

0.1 ' '

4
Estimate
-6,266,045
449,285
-801,055
-1,333,964
-1,000,130
-702,648
3,509,331
2,757,270
-687,031
-1,147,417
-0.66
1,401,605
2,296,252
10,539,919
6,175,663

5
z value
Estimate z value
-38.24 *** -5,680,218 -33.55 ***
5.22 *** 530,580
6.30 ***
-7.49 *** -878,206 -8.62 ***
-10.14 *** -1,415,822 -11.26 ***
-10.17 *** -930,655 -9.73 ***
-16.15 *** -848,900 -20.29 ***
45.56 *** 3,699,049 49.00 ***
39.99 *** 3,265,713 48.39 ***
-7.59 *** 557,480
6.30 ***
-17.87 *** -495,163 -7.99 ***
-23.82 ***
-0.65
-23.04 ***
15.22 *** 1,419,631 16.02 ***
19.10 *** 2,151,642 18.39 ***
47.93 *** 10,059,222 44.45 ***
71.68 *** 6,392,331 73.51 ***
-3,031,917 -39.80 ***
2,837,462 33.10 ***

6
Estimate z value
-5,775,346 -17.26 ***
393,776 4.11 ***
-954,096 -8.82 ***
-1,541,184 -11.36 ***
-813,255 -5.76 ***
-993,898 -19.60 ***
4,216,493 43.54 ***
3,648,564 46.83 ***
509,092 4.12 ***
-445,034 -6.20 ***
-0.61
-8.91 ***
1,380,794 12.97 ***
2,518,588 19.10 ***
9,752,915 37.03 ***
6,240,740 37.94 ***
-3,100,070 -33.88 ***
2,859,138 29.04 ***
-533,372 -2.35 *

1

Notes: IRLS=iteratively reweighted least squares. P-value of Breusch-Pagan test: less than 0.05. Since the P-value is less than 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis that
the model includes no linear heteroscedasticity. Thus, we infer that there is heteroscedasticity and use robust standard errors to correct to get unbiased standard
errors.
Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.
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6.2 Explaining the absolute change in net worth (model B)
The results from the IRLS regression with level change in net worth from 2007–2010 are
somewhat different from the results when we use the proportional change in net worth,
although as before, those living in urban areas lost more, as did those with children. Not
unexpectedly, losses in absolute terms correlated with high disposable income as well as
higher education. In this instance, those in the financial sector lost more in absolute
terms. In our view, the relative change in net worth model captures the suffering
associated with the losses better than the level change model does.

6.3 Explaining the rise in debt burden (model C)
Table 8 explains the rise in the debt burden, defined as the ratio of debt to disposable
income, from the end of 2007 to the end of 2010. We find that the following attributes
had positive and significant coefficients: the 24–35 age group, the number of children,
university education, first real estate purchase in 2008–2010 (or, to a lesser extent,
2000–2004), urban area, and employment in the financial sector. Thus, young people who
had children and worked in urban areas saw their debt burden increase the most.
Workers in the financial sector experienced a large drop in their disposable income,
which explains their positive and significant coefficient in the regression. In contrast,
older people, single women, those living in rural areas, and those who did not own real
estate had a negative coefficient, which should not come as a surprise. Again, the
relationship between the relative change in net worth and disposable income was
statistically insignificant.
We conclude that the increase in the debt burden hit young families with children the
hardest, which is consistent with our above-described results on the proportional decline
in net worth.
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Table 8: Results from Model C. Independent Variable Is Level Change in the Ratio of Debt to Disposable Income from 2007–
2010
Estimate
(Intercept)
0.52
24 to 35 years old
0.16
46 to 55 years old
-0.08
56 to 65 years old
-0.20
66 years old and older + disabled -0.38
Number of children
Single man
Single woman
University education
Secondary education
Disposable Income
First real estate 2000-2004
First real estate 2005-2007
First real estate 2008-2010
Not real estate
Capital area
Rural area
Financial or insurance sector
Significance codes:

1
t value
56.80
13.78
-6.16
-14.04
-31.82

***
***
***
***
***

Estimate
0.55
0.03
-0.09
-0.22
-0.39
-0.01
0.05
-0.09

2
t value
42.01
2.31
-6.55
-13.33
-28.09
-1.20
4.04
-9.28

0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '

Estimate
0.53
0.04
-0.09
-0.22
-0.39
-0.01
0.06
-0.09
0.05
0.03

***
*
***
***
***
***
***

3
t value
35.49
2.96
-6.55
-13.26
-27.00
-1.80
5.63
-8.48
4.11
3.05

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Estimate
0.31
-0.06
-0.03
-0.11
-0.21
0.03
0.01
-0.07
0.00
-0.04
0.01
0.08
-0.04
2.52
0.00

4
t value
27.55
-6.52
-2.82
-8.74
-19.93
6.71
0.68
-9.40
35.67
-4.91
1.41
8.97
-3.73
116.62
-0.35

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Estimate
0.32
-0.07
-0.03
-0.11
-0.22
0.03
0.00
-0.08
0.00
-0.07
0.00
0.08
-0.04
2.53
0.00
0.04
-0.06

5
t value
23.38
-6.81
-2.66
-8.68
-20.08
7.20
0.40
-10.65
34.45
-7.76
-0.35
8.89
-3.48
115.90
-0.51
4.59
-6.18

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Estimate
0.33
-0.05
-0.05
-0.14
-0.14
0.02
0.01
-0.08
0.00
-0.09
0.00
0.06
-0.11
2.70
-0.04
0.04
-0.09
0.15

6
t value
18.42
-4.48
-4.15
-9.07
-7.90
3.28
0.56
-7.29
39.95
-7.82
0.22
5.25
-6.83
97.40
-3.18
3.66
-6.34
7.54

***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

1

Notes: IRLS=iteratively reweighted least squares. Statistics for 6th Horse Race: P-value of Breusch-Pagan test: 0.4. Since the P-value is greater than 0.05, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model includes no linear heteroscedasticity. Thus, we infer that there is no heteroscedasticity and the standard errors,
and the t-values, are unbiased.
Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.
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7. Conclusions
Our results show that the 24–45 age groups had relatively the worst performance during
the crisis and were therefore vulnerable. Within these groups, urban households with
children were the most vulnerable to the crisis, especially those headed by a single
parent. Econometric analysis supports the results of the graphical analysis. It also shows
that households with lower levels of education suffered relatively larger losses than those
with higher levels of education, and that those who had bought their first home between
2000 and 2007 lost relatively more than others.
The debt burden, defined as the ratio of debt to disposable income, jumped in 2008,
compounding the effect of the fall in asset values. Net worth took until 2016 to return to
its 2003 level for the 45 years and younger groups. However, the recovery in net worth
was quicker for the over 45 years groups because losses for these groups were smaller
and their level of debt was lower. For most age groups, it took until 2015–2016 for real
disposable income to return to its 2003 level, and by 2019, it had not returned to its peak
2007 level.
The 2008–2009 crisis, brought about by a fragile and bloated banking system, affected
families with children most severely. While most survived financially to benefit from the
subsequent recovery of house prices and mortgage relief, others were not so lucky. In
spite of the government’s best efforts, the households that were most vulnerable before
the crisis did, in many cases, not manage to hold on to their property. Thousands of
families were forced to leave their homes in the aftermath of the financial crisis and did
not benefit from the postcrisis recovery of house prices. This lesson supports future use
of macroprudential policies creating buffers to limit the number of households at the
margin of insolvency and illiquidity.
The banking expansion that took place from 2003 to 2007 was plagued by deregulation,
lack of macroprudential regulation, mistakes in monetary policy, lax accounting
standards, and self-dealing by the owners of the banks. The banks’ collapse affected the
general population, especially families with children. It goes without saying that financial
market regulation and proper conduct of monetary and macroeconomic policy in general
are of pivotal importance for the well-being of a nation.
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Appendix
Figure 8: Average Net Worth, Debt, and Assets for Single Men, in Local Currency,
Constant 2019 Prices

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

Figure 9: Ratio of Debt, Net Worth, and Assets to Disposable Income for Single Men
(Median Value)

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.
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Figure 10: Average Net Worth, Debt, and Assets for Single Women, in Local
Currency, Constant 2019 Prices

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.

Figure 11: Ratio of Debt, Net Worth and Assets to Disposable Income for Single
Women (Median Value)

Source: Administrative data from tax returns available at Statistics Iceland.
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